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LIBERALIZATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES
IN MEXICO: LEGAL CHANGES ENCOURAGING NEW
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
CHARLES T. DuMARS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The nations of Mexico and the United States are drawn together by
numerous economic, political, and historical forces. While our common
history as developing nations of the new world is significant and im-
migration policies are likewise critical, the most significant force pulling
us together is our growing economic interdependence. This economic
interdependence is reflected in the extensive changes over the past three
years in Mexico's foreign investment laws. These changes cannot be
understood in a vacuum. They make sense only in a historical context
and with an understanding of the economic forces that have shaped
them. This article begins by exploring Mexico's debt crisis and its current
economic position in the world economy. This discussion is followed by
a review of the history leading up to the current foreign investment laws.
These laws are examined in detail, with particular emphasis on the
Maquiladora program. This article also explores Mexican environmental
and labor laws as they relate to the Maquiladora program.
II. MEXICO'S ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS RESPONSES
Mexico's foreign debt problems can generally be traced back to the
oil price increases of 1973-74 and 1979-80 when oil prices were forced
to new heights by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC"). The inflated prices generated large and unexpected trade
surpluses for many countries which export oil. These countries typically
handled the large surpluses by depositing substantial amounts of money
in international banks. While Mexico was not among the countries who
benefitted directly from the trade surpluses,' the international banks found
developing countries with stable governments, like Mexico, to be attractive
borrowers. During the period from 1970 to 1980, unfortunately, Mexico
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1. See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMSSIAON, REvIEw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT
LIBERALIZATION MEASUREs BY MEXICO AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED STATES - MEXICAN
RELATIONS 1-2 n.16 (1990) (Pub. 2275) [hereinafter REvIEw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT]; JOINT
ECONOUC CoMMraE, ECONObac REFORM IN MEXICO: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1988)
[hereinafter ECONosc REFORM IN MEXICO].
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used most of its borrowed funds for purposes that were not conducive
to economic development. 2
President Portillo used much of this new revenue to create para-state
industries3 when the private sector would not step in to meet demands
within the country. These industries were created not only to fill man-
ufacturing voids, but also to stimulate local economies by creating em-
ployment in regions where the local economies needed help. The para-
state industries were subsidized by money borrowed from other nations
and from foreign, private sector banks. These foreign loans were guar-
anteed sub silentio by Mexico's anticipated future oil profits.The increases in government spending during this period far outdistanced
increases in Mexico's revenues. The Mexican government responded to
the growing deficit largely through additional borrowing and monetary
expansion.4 Portillo's policies were brought to their knees by the typical
calamities that befall nations that increase the money supply by placing
borrowed capital into banks to stimulate growth or that use borrowed
capital to subsidize state industries. The increased money supply, coupled
with low interest rates, led to inflation. The inflation led to higher wages
and more money in the pockets of Mexican citizens. The policy of
artificially increasing the money supply and putting more pesos in the
pockets of Mexicans created a disparity between the Mexican official
value of the peso and the value of the peso on the international money
market. Speculators in the international money market viewed the Mexican
economy as weak and valued the peso very low. Mexico steadfastly
refused to allow the peso to float and reflect its low international exchange
rate.' Mexican citizens who had large amounts of pesos could simply go
to the national bank, buy dollars with their pesos, and travel to the
United States to spend them.
The international monetary community did not believe that this exchange
rate imbalance could continue indefinitely and considered a devaluation
of the peso to be inevitable. Mexicans who feared the devaluation of
the peso converted their pesos into dollars and then redeposited them
into banks in the United States. This capital flight from Mexico to the
2. See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIssIoN, THE EFFECT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY
DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS ON U.S. TRADE (1987) (Pub. 1950) [hereinafter THE EFFECT OF DEVELOPING
COUmTRY DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS].
3. Para-state industries are industries in which the government may have majority or minority
ownership. Para-state entities may be organized as decentralized entities or trusts. The government
also increased spending on subsidies and other aid to domestic industries, which accounted for 6106
of all government spending in 1975. REvmw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 1-2. The
result was an increase in the fiscal deficit from 2.2% of the gross domestic product in 1969 to
10.0% in 1975, and 17.2% in 1982. Id.
4. While this was a seemingly cavalier response to the growing deficit, it is likely that the
Mexican government's actions were fed by expectations that oil revenues would increase dramatically
in the future when new reservoirs discovered in the 1970's were developed. Id. Instead, oil prices
declined, and the government's monetary expansion led to inflation and overvalued currency. These
factors, in turn, caused balance of payments problems and capital flight in anticipation of peso
devaluations. Id.
5. D.O., Exchange Control Decree (Dec. 13, 1982).
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United States and other countries with a stable currency occurred at an
alarming rate. In order to curb this capital flight and to protect the
dollars that remained in the Mexican Federal Reserve Bank, President
Lopez Portillo, just prior to leaving office in 1982, nationalized the
banks6 and imposed exchange controls. 7 This action left his successor,
Miguel de La Madrid, the unhappy task of facing declining oil prices,
an $86 billion foreign debt, an exchange rate that was inconsistent with
reality, and exchange controls on currency in a country with a 2,000
mile border adjoining a neighboring country where foreign currency was
readily obtainable on the free market.
Conditions were worsened by the fact that the United States adopted
very conservative fiscal policies which increased the value of the dollar.
Because Mexican loans were denominated in dollars, the American fiscal
policy had the effect of increasing the debt value of Mexican loans. A
world recession further reduced demands for Mexican exports and limited
Mexico's opportunity to acquire foreign currency. Also, other developing
countries adopted conservative economic policies, which had the effect
of increasing interest rates on Mexico's loans.8
President Madrid began to move away from the economic isolationism
policies of previous administrations. He removed the Portillo exchange
controls and established a three tier system for exchanging pesos at the
Mexican banks designed to encourage capital investment and to gradually
allow the peso to float. For the average Mexican citizen, allowing free
market exchanges of pesos resulted in incredible devaluations. The peso
dropped from a rate of 28 pesos to the dollar in 1981 to 2,850 pesos
to the dollar in 1990.
Mexico was forced to admit it could not pay its foreign debts without
additional loans. In August of 1982, Mexico announced that it could
not make its scheduled debt payments and turned to the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") for short-term help. 9 The
help was given, and Mexico experienced a brief improvement in its
economy. By 1984, however, the debt had still risen to $97 billion. 0 The
additional banking help and the concessions that were made by creditors
6. D.O., Decree Nationalizing the Banks of Mexico (Sept. 2, 1982).
7. Id. The Mexican peso trades under three exchange rates: (1) the controlled rate, which is
set by the central bank and applies to most exports and imports, debt payments, and maquiladora
expenditures; (2) the official free rate, which is determined by and applies to transactions of
commercial banks; and (3) the private free rate, which is used for most other transactions. Since
1989, the peso has remained approximately equal to the two free rates, probably as a result of
government devaluation of the peso at a rate of approximately one peso per dollar per day.
8. In addition to the expanding deficit, three other events in the early 1980's made it difficult
for Mexico to repay its loans: (1) the worldwide recession, which reduced the demand for Mexico's
exports; (2) the adoption of conservative monetary policies by many developed countries to stop
inflation within their own systems, which had the financial effect of raising interest rates paid by
Mexico without actually changing the rates; and (3) the substantial appreciation of the U.S. dollar,
which effectively increased the value of Mexico's debts because most of Mexico's loans are de-
nominated in U.S. dollars.
9. THE EFFECT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 21-23.
10. Id. at 23-26.
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were given on the condition that Mexico make fundamental economic
policy changes. These changes included promises from Mexico to reduce
tariffs, liberalize laws restricting foreign investment, reduce public spend-
ing, reform the tax system, divest state-owned enterprises, and reform
domestic price controls." All of these measures made life even more
difficult for the Mexican people.
In 1985, the IMF suspended its agreement with Mexico after the Mexican
government increased spending and exceeded anticipated fiscal deficits.
Mexico's economic problems were further compounded by the major
earthquake in Mexico City in the fall of 1985 and by the dramatic
decreases in export revenues when oil prices fell substantially in 1986.
Mexico again asked for help in 1986. The IMF, the World Bank, and
commercial banks responded by entering into major new agreements with
Mexico. In exchange, Mexico promised certain reforms in its economic
policies, including reduction of trade restrictions and liberalization of
foreign investment.1 2 After Mexico began implementing the promised
reforms and liberalizing its import trade regime, Mexico decided to
reapply 3 for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT,,).14
Mexico's first significant act of modern trade reform was its entry
into GATT, an international trade administrative body." Membership in
GATT involves appointment of a working body to review the application
of accession and to submit recommendations to the GATT Council. A
working body was appointed for Mexico in February of 1986, and by
August of 1986, Mexico had become the 92nd Contracting Party inGATT.' 6 Because Mexico was able to accede to GATT as a developing
11. EcoNoInc REFORM n MEXICO, supra note 1.
12. REVIEw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 1-3 n.17.
13. In November of 1985, President Miguel de la Madrid announced formal actions to applyfor membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade during the Tokyo Round. Application
was made on January 16, 1979. D.O. (Nov. 25, 1985).
14. Among the rebuilding efforts following World War II was an attempt by the Western allies
to charter the International Trade Organization ("ITO") to standardize international trade rules.
The ITO failed to be ratified, but from it came an agreement to a more general set of commercial
trade policies. This agreement became known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade("GATT"). It is not binding on its members, but it acts as a guideline for international trade
practices.
15. GATT discussions reflected a realization by both developing and developed countries that
the world trading system needed updating. This realization was generally a response to increasedprotectionism, greater use of nontariff trade barriers, and a worldwide economic slump. Mexico
was both a new GATT member and a developing country at the time of these debates. It assumed
a moderate role in the negotiations.
16. REVnw OF TRADE AD INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2-1. At that time, Mexico was the
world's 13th largest economy and the largest market economy outside of GATT. Mexico had first
tried to join GATT in 1979. President Lopez Portillo, perhaps bowing to political and economicpressures, announced in 1980 that Mexico would delay its entry into GATT. Sources of opposition
were varied. The intellectual left feared that Mexico would lose its autonomy if it became a GATT
member; CANACINTRA, an organization of small manufacturers, maintained that joining GATT
would not improve employment or the distribution of wealth; labor unions felt that joining GAIT
would result in lost jobs. Id. In addition, increasing oil prices fueled the belief that the need toliberalize manufactured trade rather than continue import substitution should be postponed. Id.When oil prices fell in mid-1981, the Mexican economy collapsed, and Mexico began looking for
long-term alternative solutions to its economic problems.. Id.
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country, it was entitled to the special treatment afforded developing
countries.1 7 Mexico was also allowed to continue to exercise sovereignty
over its natural resources and to retain the priority status of its agricultural
section in economic and social policies.'
As part of its contribution to GATT, Mexico agreed to: (1) bind its
entire tariff schedule to a maximum level of fifty percent ad valorem;
(2) limit surtaxes applied to general tariffs in nine sectors and reduce
the surtax to zero in eight years; (3) conform to Article VII of the
General Agreement in its customs valuation procedures and eliminate its
official pricing system by December 1987; and (4) gradually eliminate its
import permit requirements. 9 Mexico would not agree to eliminate its
various additional charges on imports. 20
Negotiations between the United States and Mexico culminated in a
four part understanding reached in 1987. The "Framework of Principles
and Procedures for Consultation Regarding Trade and Investment Re-
lations" ("Bilateral Accord") was the first formal bilateral mechanism
governing commercial relations between the two countries. The Bilateral
Accord included four parts: (1) statement of principles; (2) consultive
mechanism; (3) data exchange; and (4) Immediate Action Agenda. The
most significant of these elements was the establishment of a means by
which the two countries could consult and negotiate on trade issues, trade
disputes, and trade barriers. 2' The Bilateral Accord also set into motion
negotiations on the Immediate Action Agenda in the areas of textiles,
agriculture, steel, electronics, products, investment matters, technology
transfer (intellectual property rights protection), and service industries.
22
The Bilateral Accord is generally viewed as a turning point in improvement
of the historically strained relations between the United States and Mexico. 2
17. GATT, PROTOCOL FOR THE ACCESSION OF MEXICO TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE, in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1985-1986). REvIEw OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2-1. A developing country does not have to extend to a developed
country reciprocity of a negotiated concession. REVIEw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1,
at 2-1 n.7.
18. GATT, supra note 17, at 4.
19. REVIEW OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2-2.
20. If these duties are still in effect by the end of December 1990, the contracting parties will
review the matter. Id. at 2-2.
21. Id. at 2-3.
22. Id. at 2-3 to 2-4.
23. From January of 1988 through July of 1989, four consultations and three plenary sessions
under the 1987 Bilateral Accord were held. Topics of discussion and negotiation included the United
States' interest in loosening restrictions on the Mexican electronics sector to permit increased exports
and foreign investment, the exchange of investment data, a discussion of Mexico's investment
regulations relating to small business, improving Mexican patent and copyright laws, a discussion
of agriculture, and review of Mexico's computer industry guidelines. REvIEw OF TRADE AND IN-
VESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2-4. Less formal dialogue was conducted in areas such as intellectual
property rights, insurance, investment data exchange, motor carriers, and general policy cooperation
and coordination. Id. In August of 1989, the United States Department of Agriculture and the
Mexican Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources agreed to create five binational technical
groups to promote cooperation and aid commerce: (1) technical and administrative programs; (2)
improvement of marketing; (3) inspection and research; (4) data collection; and (5) coordination of
research programs. Id.
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Two sectoral accords have been reached since the Bilateral Accord was
signed in 1987. The first covered steel and alcoholic beverages3u The
second, effective January 1, 1988, was the Textile Agreement.25 Thepossibility of inclusion of services and intellectual property agreements
in GATT received heated discussion. While the United States was a
proponent of the inclusion of services26 and sought protection for intel-
lectual property, Mexico pushed for technology transfer concessions for
developing countries.
Mexico also argued that the world economy should enhance the ec-
onomic development of developing countries by: (1) recognizing that
equal treatment among unequal partners cannot occur; (2) including labor
intensive services and labor flows, preferential arrangements for developing
countries, and procedures for speeding up transfers of technology todeveloping countries; and (3) recognizing that certain laws and regulations
relating to the development interests of developing countries are not
barriers to trade in services. 27
On the intellectual property issue, developing countries argued for the
importance of access to new technology to promote industrial develop-
ment. Developing countries believed that rising costs connected withincreased standards and enforcement measures relating to intellectual
property would restrain their economic development. The developed coun-
tries' objections to inclusion of intellectual property was based on the
belief that new technological innovations, such as computer software and
pharmaceutical products, should be protected from piracy and imitation. 28
24. The United States agreed to a one time increase of 12.4% in Mexico's steel quotas, andMexico agreed to restrict exports of finished steel during the period between 1985 and 1990. Id.
at 2-5. Mexico agreed to: (1) limit exports of certain steel wire products which had not been subject
to earlier restrictions; (2) eliminate import quotas and, as a new GATT member, eliminate all
official steel reference prices as of December 1987; and (3) eliminate import quotas on certainproducts such as alcohol, flowers, and agricultural products, and lift annual quotas on imports of
beer and wine. Id.
25. The Textile Agreement raised United States import quotas on Mexican textile and apparelproducts. Mexico was permitted to supplement textile exports to the United States by six percent
each year for four subsequent years. In exchange, Mexico agreed to lower trade barriers to UnitedStates exports of yarns and white goods (e.g., bleached cotton and linen fabrics) and phase outimport license requirements for all garments and textiles (except for carpets, tapestries and used
clothing). The Textile Agreement also imposed controls on Mexico's exports of cotton, wool, and
manmade fiber textiles and apparel to the United States through 1991. Id.26. On the services issue, developing countries feared that developed countries would demand
unrequited concessions of the developing countries even before developed countries offered any
concessions in the more traditional GATT areas of tariff reductions and market access. Developed
countries also approved of the fact that the services issue raised the likelihood of increased movement
of labor across borders. While developed countries agreed that greater freedom of movement forprofessional and skilled workers was required if GATT covered the services area, they disagreed
with the developing countries' call for increased mobility because of a conflict with most immigration
laws.
Among its various proposals relating to the inclusion of services, Mexico argued that any accordin services should generally aim to increase the production, productivity, employment, and service-
related exports of developing countries.
27. REviEW OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2-9 n.79; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, URUGUAY ROUND PAPERS ON SELECTED ISSUES 99-101 (1989).28. REvEW OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2-9 n.67.
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Mexico argued that intellectual property rights must be balanced against
public and economic interests. It proposed special measures for developing
countries, including shorter terms for patents, legal aid for countries to
improve their intellectual property systems, and increased availability of
financial resources so that developing countries could modify their current
patent and trademark systems. 29 While it may seem unusual that developing
countries are concerned about patent protection and intellectual property
rules, these changes are important because the lack of protection of
patents and intellectual property in these countries is a major deterrent
to technology transfer. 30
External pressures from membership in GATT, failure of short-term
economic fixes to slow inflation, and rising interest rates forced Mexican
interest groups to take cooperative actions to deal with the crisis. This
cooperative action was reflected in the 1987 Economic Solidarity Pact
("Pact"). This Pact was an agreement among government, labor, business
and other economic interests. Its purpose was to implement reforms and
achieve economic policy objectives, and its major policy objective was
to reduce the inflation rate. 31 To meet its objectives, the Pact called for
price and wage freezes, reductions in spending and the public sector
deficit, divestiture of many of Mexico's state-owned ventures, and re-
laxation of Mexico's restrictions on foreign investment.3 2 The Pact, which
was later renamed the Pact for Stability and Economic Growth, was
scheduled to remain in effect through July of 1990.
33
The Mexican government and private debtors also were able to retire
some of the country's debt by engaging in debt-equity swaps. Under this
arrangement, Mexico acquired several billion dollars of debt at a discount
in exchange for pesos that were required to be invested in Mexico. These
swaps allowed Mexico to buy back its own debt at a discount and obtain
foreign investment at the same time. The investors also benefitted from
the swaps because the discount they gave the government was smaller
than the discount they received when they bought debt on the secondary
debt market. 34
Foreign debt decreased overall from $107.4 billion in 1987 to $96.3
billion in September of 1989.11 During the period between 1987 and 1989,
private sector debt decreased by almost $10 billion. 36 These figures reflected
29. Id. at 2-10.
30. The pirating of pharmaceuticals, computer software, cassette tapes, and other easily copied
products has made foreign industry understandably reluctant to bring state-of-the-art technology to
these countries if their research investment can be lost without any remedy in the host country.
31. RE vEw OF TRADE AND INvEsTmENT, supra note 1, at 1-3.
32. EcoNoac REFORM IN MEXICO, supra note 1.
33. Mexico's economy has improved significantly since the country began making reforms under
the Pact. Its inflation rate fell from almost 160% in early 1988 to less than 20% in 1989. The
government's fiscal deficit decreased from 16.10o of the gross domestic product in 1987 to ap-
proximately 6.3% in 1989, and it is expected to decrease further in 1990. REvIEw OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 1-3.
34. Id. at 1-4.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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investors' renewed confidence in the Mexican economy. 37 One major factor
in this confidence was a new debt agreement, called the Brady Plan,
which was negotiated in 1989. The Brady Plan allowed reductions in
principal and interest and the granting of new loans to developing coun-
tries, which limited public sector spending, encouraged foreign investment,
and minimized subsidies to domestic industries.38
Mexico reached a preliminary-new debt agreement with its commercial
creditors under the Brady Plan in July of 1989. The agreement gave
banks three alternatives: (1) reduce the principal on outstanding Mexican
loans by 35%/c with a rate of interest equal to the London Interbank
Offer Rate ("LIBOR") plus 13/1601o collateralized with U.S. Treasury
Bonds; (2) reduce interest on outstanding loans to 6.25%, collateralized
in the same manner; or (3) make new loans in the amount of 250 of
the current debt with an interest rate equal to LIBOR plus 13/1607. 39
Maturity rates under the first two options were increased from twenty
to thirty years, and the amortization period for new money under the
third option was placed at fifteen years, with a seven year grace period. 40
The reduction in the debt owed to banks approving the first two
options was estimated by the Mexican government to be approximately
$14.75 billion, and banks made available $1.5 billion in new loans under
the third option between 1990 and 1992. In addition, Mexico estimated
its external debt to be $93.6 billion in the spring of 1990, representing
a decline of $2.7 billion since the fall of 1989. 41 While there was virtually
no change in 1988, public sector debt fell almost $1.7 billion, to $78.3
billion, during the first quarter of 1989.42
During his October 3, 1989 visit to the United States, Mexican President
Salinas and President Bush signed the "Understanding Between the Gov-
ernment of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United
States of America Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks"("TIFTs"). While building on the 1987 Bilateral Accord, the TIFTs also
established a negotiating process for expanding trade and investment
opportunities. 4a The TIFTs were a significant step in bilateral commercial
relationships between the two countries because they: (1) provided for
37. "Mexicans began to repatriate the assets they had sent abroad in the early and mid-1980's.
The Government reported a return of over $2.5 billion in private capital in 1989 alone." REvEw
OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 1-4; see also SECRETARIAT DE HACIENDA Y CREDTO
PuBuco, Tm RENEGOTIATION OF MEXICO's EXTERNAL DEBT 20 (1990) [hereinafter HACIENDA].38. REvmw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 1-4.39. HACIENDA, supra note 37, at 10; AMEICAN EMBASSY, MEXICO, ECONOMIC TRENDS REPORT(Nov. 1989) [hereinafter ECONOMIC TRENDS REPORT].
40. HACIENDA, supra note 37, at 10. Creditor governments also agreed to reschedule $2.6 billion
of interest and principal payments scheduled to come due over the next three years. The International
Monetary Fund made $3.6 billion available to Mexico over three years. The World Bank agreed
to three development loans and an energy sector loan totalling $1.96 billion and to provide additional
loans between 1990 and 1992. Japan agreed to lend Mexico $2.05 billion. Spain agreed to provide$4 billion to Mexico in credits and investment. ECONOMIC TRENDS REPORT, supra note 39.
41. HACIENDA, supra note 37, at 14.42. AMERICAN EMBASSY, MEXICO, FOREIGN INVESTMENT CLIMATE REPORT 2 (June 1989).
43. REvEw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 2-6.
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comprehensive trade and investment negotiations; (2) focused on specific
products as well as cross-sectoral issues such as services, intellectual
property rights, technology, and investment; (3) provided for binational,
rather than separate, teams of government experts to gather, review, and
analyze information before negotiations begin; and (4) established a time-
table to guide talks through various stages.
III. THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW OF MEXICO - ORIGIN
AND CURRENT TERMS
While numerous problems have been cited as root causes for the Mexican
revolution of the early 1900's, scholars generally agree upon four primary
causes. One cause was the explosive population growth of persons of
Indian and Spanish heritage who were locked out of the political deci-
sionmaking process by the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz." A second cause
was the Diaz laissez faire economic policy of encouraging foreign in-
vestment by permitting major industries to exploit labor .4 A third cause
was the policy which allowed unlimited foreign ownership of real property
and resulted in the removal of campesinos from the lands they had
traditionally farmed. A fourth cause was the perceived exploitation of
the poor by the Catholic Church and its consistent alignment with the
wealthy. This final cause is not germane to this article and is not discussed.
A new Mexican constitution was drafted in 1917 when the revolution
ended. One of the major goals of the constitution was to prevent the
recurrence of the social evils that lay at the heart of the revolution.
Article 27 nationalized the water, mineral, and land resources in the
name of the Mexican state and required states to obtain a permit for
the use of these resources. It also created a restricted zone near the
seacoast and the borders of the country where foreign ownership was
prohibited. Article 123 made labor law constitutional law by establishing
extensive rights for workers. The 1917 Constitution also contains the
famous "Calvo Clause," ' 47 which requires foreigners doing business in
Mexico to waive their right to assert their status as foreigners as a defense
to legal actions.
In the years following the revolution, Mexico began to function as a
socialist country by allocating its resources and pursuing social justice
through direct government intervention. In the late 1930's, President
44. R. HERGET & J. CAMIL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEXIcAN LEGAL SYSTEM 14-15 (1978).
45. Id. at 13.
46. Id.
47. CONSTITUCION POLrTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNiDos MEXICANOS, art. 27, par. I (as amended
January 6, 1960). The Calvo Clause is:
The doctrine stated by the Argentine jurist, Carlos Calvo, that a government is
not bound to indemnify aliens for losses or injuries sustained by them in consequence
of domestic disturbances or civil war, where the state is not at fault, and that
therefore foreign states are not justified in intervening, by force or otherwise, to
secure the settlement of claims of their citizens on account of such losses or injuries.
Such intervention ... is contrary to the principle of state sovereignty.
BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 186 (5th ed. 1979).
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Lazaro Cardenas nationalized the American oil companies and created
Petroleos Mexicanos ("PEMEX"), a state-owned and state-operated pe-
troleum development company. President Cardenas was considered a
national hero for standing up to the United States, and he continues to
hold an important place in Mexico's history.
During World War II, Mexico increased its sales of goods in the world
market, taking up the slack while other countries were running their
industrial war machines. Even after the war, Mexico achieved steady
growth. It boasted a stable currency and took great pride in its stable
banking industry. Because of the stability of the Mexican economy, foreign
investment in Mexico continued into the late forties and early fifties.
While there was skepticism from the political left as to the propriety of
allowing foreign investment, there was no outright hostility. It was not
until the arrival of President Luis Escheverria in the early 1970's that
there was a major policy shift condemning direct foreign investment.
Mexico adopted a policy of import substitution to strengthen its industries
by excluding imports and forcing Mexican citizens to purchase goods
made in Mexico. According to theory, exclusion of imports would create
a market demand within the country to which Mexican industries would
respond.48 The import substitution policy was accompanied by "The Law
to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment of
1973. " 49 This law placed certain industries, such as petrochemicals and
utilities, exclusively within the control of the state 0 and set a maximum
of forty-nine percent or less equity ownership by foreigners in virtually
all businesses in Mexico. 1
This policy of "Mexicanization" of industries continued relatively un-
changed until the early 1980's when a number of resolutions were passed
which were designed to promote foreign investment and to attract the
badly needed capital to pay off the extensive foreign debt. These reso-
lutions included the February 17, 1984 guidelines promulgated by the
Foreign Investment Commission. These guidelines were never published
in the Diario Official and therefore were not changes in law. They did,
however, suggest that majority foreign ownership in thirty-three selected
activities falling within nine general areas was encouraged and that there
was no need to "Mexicanize" (have fifty-one percent Mexican owned
stock) after organization in these areas.5 2 The resolutions of September
2, 1986 relaxed the majority ownership requirement in certain small and
medium-sized firms, provided that foreign investors were willing to risk
48. EcoNohuc REFORM iN MExico, supra note 1, at 5.
49. D.O., The Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment (Mar. 9,
1973).
50. Id. art. 4(a).
51. Id. art. 5(d).
52. The nine industrial areas of activities were: (1) manufacture of non-electric equipment and
machinery; (2) manufacture of electric machinery and appliances; (3) the machine tools industry;(4) the electronics industry; (5) transportation equipment and materials; (6) the chemical industry;(7) other manufacturing industries (including medical and photographic equipment and new high
technology materials); (8) biotechnology; and (9) the hotel industry.
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their capital to obtain temporary, majority-like control, and provided
this majority control was phased out over a ten year period.53 Also, in
1986, there was an increase in permissible foreign participation in certain
petrochemical industries.5 4 On February 3, 1988, the Foreign Investment
Commission streamlined its procedure for review of foreign investment
applications and allowed acquisition of up to forty-nine percent of the
equity interest of a firm without prior approval, as well as expansion
of additional equity interests by existing investors without Foreign In-
vestment Commission approval."
The major Foreign Investment Law breakthrough came under the
leadership of the current President of Mexico, Carlos Salinas de Gotari.
These regulations are called "The Regulations of the Law to Promote
Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment.''56 They repeal all
existing regulations, resolutions, and decrees, but do not modify the law
itself. The stated intent of the regulations is to increase the volume of
investment capital and also to accelerate the flow of investment capital
by simplifying and clarifying foreign investment procedures and providing
secure and clear legal rules for investment.
The regulations contain a table of business activities that are regulated
in varying degrees by the government of Mexico. These include: (1)
activities exclusively carried out by the state; (2) activities exclusively for
Mexican citizens; (3) activities limited to thirty-four, forty, and forty-
nine percent foreign ownership; and (4) activities that have no percentage
limit on foreign investor control (unclassified activities).
These regulations are complex and only the most significant provisions
are discussed here. The areas of greatest interest to the foreign investor
are the unclassified activities. In these activities, there is automatic ap-
proval of 100% foreign investment. The Foreign Investment Commission
automatically approves up to 100% ownership in unclassified industries
if the following conditions are met:
(1) The investment in fixed assets during the preoperative period does
not exceed the peso equivalent of 100 million dollars;
(2) The project is funded with foreign capital;
(3) The project, if industrial, is not in Mexico City, Guadalajara, or
Monterey;
(4) The project anticipates that accumulated foreign exchange flows
will be, at a minimum, in balance over the first three years of the
project;
(5) The project anticipates creation of permanent jobs and establishes
53. General Resolutions Nos. 14 and 15.
54. General Resolution No. 15, art. 1 §§ A(l), A(2).
55. For a list of the 36 basic petrochemicals that were reclassified as secondary and the remaining
34 basic petrochemicals, see FOREIGN INVESTMENT BARRIERS OR OTHER REsTRICTIONS THAT PREVENT
FOREIGN CAPrrAL FROM CLAIMING Tr BENEFrrs OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 2-5 (Pub. 2212)
(1989).
56. D.O., The Regulations of the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign
Investment (May 16, 1989).
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worker training programs and personnel development programs; and
(6) The project employs technologies adequate to meet environmental
requirements .57
Upon filing of the necessary papers to begin a new business, approval
is automatic if the Foreign Investment Commission does not respond
within forty-five days of the date of the application." Until May 16,
1992, if an existing company is acquired by a foreign investor in an
unclassified area, approval of the acquisition is not necessary if the above
criteria are met and if the investor agrees to increase the fixed assets of
the company by at least thirty percent.5 9 Otherwise, acquiring a majority
ownership of an existing company requires Foreign Investment Com-
mission approval.
The regulations of May 1989 also allow foreign investors, with the
approval of the Foreign Investment Commission, to acquire rights, by
means of a twenty year trust, of up to 100%70 ownership in certain
classified activities if there is a finding of economic benefit and if the
activity is not exclusively reserved for Mexicans or the state.60
The new regulations also allow foreigners to access the Mexican stock
market through use of a trust. Essentially, through a trust which is usually
controlled by a Mexican bank, foreign investors are allowed to own
certificates of participation in funds which are comprised of Mexican
companies traded on the market. The participation rights reflect control
only over the economic rights of the stock.6
While thirty year trust ownership of real estate in the restricted zones
was common prior to May of 1989, the new laws set out specific criteria
for the trusts that are designed to guarantee their validity. 62 In addition,
real estate trusts can be extended for an additional thirty years. 6a Renewal
is automatic if the beneficiaries remain the same and hold the property
on the same terms. Trust approval is expedited under the new law.
Approval is automatic after forty-five days from the date of the application
if the Secretariat of Foreign Relations takes no action on the matter.
If, by acquisition, new and productive investments are to be made in
tourism-related activities in the restricted zone, foreign investors may also
now acquire beneficial rights in existing Mexican trusts holding interests
in real property in the restricted zone. Other changes in Mexico's foreign
investment regime include regulations opening up the petrochemical in-
dustry on August 14, 1989, 64 the banking industry in December of 1989,65
and the insurance industry on January 3, 1990. 66
57. Id. title 2, art. 5.
58. Id. title 1, art. 2.
59. Id. art. 5.
60. Id. art. 26.
61. Id. arts. 13-15.
62. Id. art. 17.
63. Id. art. 20.
64. REvmw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 5-10 n.76.
65. See D.O., Decree by Which Several Provisions of the Regulatory Law of Banking and Credit
Public Service are Amended, Enlarged, and Revoked (Dec. 27, 1989).
66. REvraw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 5-11.
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One area of foreign investment which was grounded in liberal principles
of foreign investment policy was the offshore assembly industry, or
Maquiladora program. This program, though liberal in focus, antedated
many of the current changes. It was established in 1965 as a part of
New Mexico's border industrialization program. 67 It was designed to offset
the impact of the loss of the Bracero program that sent seasonal workers
to the United States. 68 Initially, the program was limited to a twenty
kilometer strip along the border; however, it has been expanded through-
out Mexico. 69 The program is simple in concept. It allows parts of items
to be imported into Mexico for assembly and then returned to the United
States after assembly, with a United States duty paid only on the value
added by assembly. In order to ensure that the finished products are
returned to the United States, a bond is required in the amount of the
duty which would have to be paid if the product is not re-exported to
the United States. 70 United States legal provisions allow for duty-free re-
entry of the assembled products and preferential duty-free treatment to
goods from developing countries, such as Mexico.7'
The program's success is based on three major factors. First, labor
costs for assembly in the United States are high. Second, labor costs in
Mexico are extraordinarily low in comparison to costs in the United
States because of a currency exchange rate favorable to United States
businesses and because of the differences in the standard of living between
the two countries. 72 Third, Mexico holds a comparative advantage with
respect to transportation costs over potential competitors in Asia and
other parts of the world. While these other nations can also provide an
abundant supply of inexpensive labor, the distance to that labor supply
is great when compared with the distance to Mexico.
Since its inception, the maquila industry has provided great benefits
to the Mexican economy. It has provided both employment and much
needed foreign currency, particularly during the last decade. As a source
of foreign exchange, it ranks second only to petroleum. The growth of
the maquila program has been phenomenal. In 1965, there were twelve
maquilas. As of August of 1989, there were 1,699 maquilas employing
433,682 workers in Mexico. 73 Maquilas are involved in numerous light
industries, including textiles, apparel, furniture, and electronics parts.
67. The term maquiladora comes from the Spanish word "maquila," which was the amount of
corn that farmers used to pay a miller for his services. See Tarbox, An Investor's Introduction to
Mexico's Maquiladora Program, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 109 (1987).
68. The Bracero, or Mexican Labor Program, allowed migrant Mexican workers to enter the
United States on a temporary basis from 1942 through 1964. See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION, THE USE AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF Tsus ITEMS 806.30 AND 807.00 8-1 (Pub.
2053) (1988).
69. D.O., Decree for Development and Operation of the Maquiladora Industry (Dec. 22, 1989)
[hereinafter Maquiladora Decree].
70. Mexican Law on In-Bond Processing Plants art. 23.
71. These provisions are HTS 9802.00.60 and HTS 9802.00.80.
72. For example, the average Mexican wage rate in U.S. dollars declined from $2.96 per hour
in 1980 to $1.37 per hour in 1987. See THE EFFECT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT SERVICING
PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 8-10.
73. REVIEW OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 84 n.107.
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Maquilas even perform such tasks as sorting coupons and molding china
from freeze-dried clay powder. Foreign exchange from the industry has
gone from $772 million in 1980 to $2.3 billion in 1988.74 Foreign exchange
earnings in 1989 were anticipated at approximately $3 billion. 71
The majority of the maquila firms are from the United States; however,
Mexican companies have participated, as have European countries. Jap-
anese firms have moved into the market with fifty-eight firms in 1989.
The majority of the Japanese operations are located in Baja, California. 76
The maquila program was first expressly authorized through the Sec-
retary of Commerce and Industrial Development in 1971. On paper, the
overall process of operating a maquila is straightforward, but historically
it has been cumbersome in application. Much' of the bureaucratic red
tape has been changed by the new regulations discussed below. In general,
a business submits an application to operate as a maquila describing the
nature of the operation, its location, its expected employment, and other
relevant information. A license is then issued by the Mexican government
and work begins. A maquila can import capital equipment for use in
its business operations without paying a duty. Raw materials imported
for assembly may also be imported without duty, but they must be
utilized during a specific time period and re-exported as part of a finished
product. The maquila can be a Mexican corporation or it can be 100%
foreign-owned. It can be Mexican-owned with United States management,
or the maquila may simply be a Mexican company that has subcontracted
to assemble a product without foreign management. Maquilas can be
established for all industries except those exclusively reserved for the
state.
The allowing of 100% foreign ownership of maquilas is an express
exception to the Foreign Investment Law.77 This exception received formal
approval by General Resolution Number 92 of the Foreign Investment
Commission in 1984. Eighty percent of the maquilas operate near the
border, and those within the prohibited zone hold property through a
Mexican bank as trustee. From the outset, foreign ownership was allowed
because the industries that brought in parts for assembly did not compete
in the Mexican market by selling their products in Mexico; rather, they
re-exported their goods for sale outside the country. As a result, the
entire output of the maquila had to be returned to the foreign state. In
1983, the regulations were changed to allow maquilas to sell up to twenty
74. American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico. Although the Mexican value added tax accounts
for around 24% of the total value of maquiladora production, local content comprises only about
1.7% on average for the industry. MARTIN, DROUGHT, AND ToRaES, IN c., II(1) MAQUXAMEx BRIEFS
3 (March 1990).
75. REvIEw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 88 n.113.
76. This figure includes all maquiladoras with Japanese participation, whether it be minority,
majority or wholly-owned. EMBASSY OF MEXICO FACT SHEET: MEXICo's MAQUILADoRAS: FACTS AND
FIGuRs table 1, at 6.
77. 1984 General Resolution No. 2, issued by the National Foreign Investment Commission
("CNIE").
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percent of their production in the Mexican market under certain con-
ditions, including compliance with an established foreign currency budget,
technology transfer, domestic content requirements, and proof that Mex-
ican producers cannot meet existing demand. 7 Very few maquilas meet
this rigorous criteria. In April of 1988, only fifteen maquilas were au-
thorized to sell products in the Mexican market.
79
The process of liberalization of the maquila industry began in 1986
with the decision to allow regional offices of the Secretary of Commerce
and Industrial Development ("SECOFI") (rather than the Mexico City
office) to approve maquila applications in most areas of maquila op-
eration. On February 3, 1988, the Foreign Investment Commission stream-
lined the process even more. It repealed preexisting regulations and made
sweeping changes. Prior to these reforms, it was impossible to acquire
an existing maquila business without approval of the Foreign Investment
Commission unless it was already at least seventy-five percent foreign-
owned. Under the new regulations, an existing Mexican-owned maquila
can be acquired or leased into a new economic activity without prior
approval of the Foreign Investment Commission, provided the assembled
products are exported or provided to another maquila. The regulations
also extend the 100% foreign ownership exception to textiles and apparel
products .1
Article 6 of the May 16, 1989 regulations expressly provides that no
prior authorization of foreign participation in existing maquiladora en-
terprises is required. This article formally confirms the liberalization
measures extended by the 1988 resolution discussed above.
On December 23, 1989, the "Decree for the Development and Operation
of the Maquiladora Industry for Exportation" became law. It replaced
the 1983 decree mentioned above, and it made significant changes in the
operation of maquilas.81 For example, there is now "one stop shopping"
for maquila approval. One office within SECOFI is now authorized to
approve all aspects of maquila operation, including program approvals
and registration with the National Maquila Industry Registry, the Foreign
Investment Comnission, the Secretariat of Foreign Relations, the Federal
Taxpayers Registry, the National Fund for Workers Housing Institute,
and the Mexican Social Security Institute. Previously, nine different agen-
cies had to approve a maquila. Local SECOFI offices can perform this
service, and travel to Mexico City is no longer necessary.,
Previously, maquila licenses were valid for only two years. After two
years, a license had to be renewed or operations had to be suspended.
Now, maquila licenses are valid for an indefinite period.83 Also, replace-
ment of capital equipment was difficult because old equipment had to
78. D.O., The Decree for the Development and Operation of the In-Bond Export Industry art.
12 (Aug. 15, 1983); see also Maquiladora Decree, supra note 69, art. 13.
79. E. ECHEVERRIA-CAREOLL, MAQUILAS, EcoNoMIc IMPACTS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT OPPOR-
TUNMES: JAPANESE MAQun.As - A SPECIAL CASE, 4 Research Monograph, Bureau of Business Research,
Graduate School of Business, University of Texas, Austin (1988).
80. 1988 General Resolution § V.
81. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 69, art. 3, § VII.
82. REviEw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 5-1 n.133.
83. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 69, art. 7.
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be re-exported and importation of certain capital goods was difficult.
Now, the law provides for automatic replacement of machinery and
equipment. Telecommunications and computer equipment fall within this
duty-free importation category.8 Another significant change is the ability
to bring trucks, trailers, and containers across the border. These may
remain in the country for three months, thus avoiding difficult loading
and unloading requirements at the border.85
Access to the Mexican market has also been substantially liberalized.
Under the new decree, a maquila may sell into the Mexican market an
amount equal to fifty percent of its total export sales during the preceding
year.86 These Mexican market sales cannot reduce existing sales; they
must be in addition to the previous level of exports. Thus, a company
can sell into the Mexican market only if it increases its overall production.
It cannot sell into the domestic market in excess of one-third of its
current production.8
Under the new decree, virtually all of the cumbersome preconditions
for sale into the Mexican market have been removed. A maquila need
only show its ability to maintain a positive foreign currency account. A
positive currency account exists if the maquila's expenditures of foreign
currency in Mexico on labor, operating expenses, supplies, etc., exceed
the value of imports used in production.88
One of the main goals of the liberalization measures in the maquila
industry is to make the industry a part of the overall economy of the
country. To achieve this goal, the Mexican government has offered tax
breaks to encourage the use of local Mexican materials in sales into the
Mexican market. The duty structure also promotes the use of local
materials. For example, when a maquila sells into the Mexican market,
duties must be paid on the imported product.8 9 One option is to simply
pay a duty based on tariff rates applicable to the final product as though
it had been imported in finished condition into the country. A second
option is to include local materials (local content) and pay duty only on
the value of the imported components, which is usually less than the
tariff rate on the overall product. The local content requirements, which
must be met to get the more favorable tariff rates, are based upon a
percentage of the overall cost of the parts going into the product. These
amounts are two percent the first year, three percent the second year,
and four percent each year after that.90
84. Id. art. 10, § II.
85. Id. art. 10, § IV.
86. Id. art. 20.
87. Id.
88. "This is not the same concept as a foreign trade balance since maquila exports are considered
transfers, not sales transactions and are not counted in Mexico's trade statistics." REvEW OF TRADE
AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 5-17 n.140.
89. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 69, art. 22.
90. "Local content in the maquila industry averages around 1.7%." REvEEW OF TRADE AND
INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 5-17 n.142.
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The new law replaces the previous organization for support of the
maquila industry with a new work group that operates out of SECOFI
and has as its mission streamlining and supporting maquila operations.
This is a vast improvement over pre-existing conditions where numerous
offices had jurisdiction over the maquila industry.
IV. EXCHANGE CONTROLS FOR MAQUILADORAS
Under Articles 2 and 5 of the Exchange Controls Decree,9' and Articles
42 through 45 of the Complementary Exchange Control Rules, 92 companies
which operate under maquiladora status must pay for all operating ex-
penses incurred by the company in pesos. The pesos must have been
exchanged for dollars at the controlled market rate of exchange. All
payments made for wages, lease payments, procurement of goods or
services, taxes, insurance and bond premiums, or interest are subject to
this rule. The requirement also applies to other operating expenses in
Mexico. This restriction does not apply to the acquisition of fixed assets
or to rental payments if the purpose of the payment is to repay a foreign
currency loan obtained from a foreign banking institution to finance the
facility. 93
Article 47 of the exchange control rules also requires that federal or
local taxes be paid with pesos obtained under the controlled market. This
phrase has been interpreted to include all taxes paid by a maquiladora,
regardless of the originating event. Authorities have allowed peso tax
refunds to a maquiladora to be used to pay for operating expenses,
provided the tax was originally paid with pesos generated from the sale
of dollars at the controlled market rate.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR FOREIGN
INVESTORS OPERATING IN MEXICO
A. Air and Water Quality in General
As noted above, Mexico is a country that faces substantial economic
challenges as it struggles to cope with the devalued peso and inflation.
In addition to the above challenges, Mexico City labors under intense
air pollution problems because it has millions of motor vehicles and over
100,000 local industries. Some calculate that residents of Mexico City
breathe in over six million tons of toxins. Mexico likewise faces serious
air and water quality problems at its border with the United States. To
date, Mexico's response to this problem has been vocal but indirect. In
addition to conducting investigations of these ecological problems, Mexico
has created elaborate plans, commissions, and subagencies to address
these problems.
91. D.O. (Dec. 20, 1985).
92. D.O. (May 11, 1987).
93. Id. art. 47.
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Mexico's first major steps toward solving pollution problems included
amendments to its constitution and the creation, in January of 1972, of
the Subsecretary of Environmental Improvement under the Secretariat of
Health and Assistance. These acts were followed by the creation of the
more powerful position of Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology
("SEDUE") in December of 1982. This position was further refined and
focused with the creation of the Subsecretary of Ecology and its further
bifurcation into Directorates of Air Pollution and Water Pollution. Not-
withstanding the creation of these positions and agencies, the results of
Mexico's attempts to control pollution problems have been mixed at best
because the various agencies have languished from a lack of financial
resources and overlapping jurisdiction.
On December 23, 1987, the Mexican legislature passed a new law
relating to environmental protection in Mexico titled the "General Law
of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection" ("Environ-
mental Law").94 The law is massive. It is divided into six headings and
subdivided into twenty-six chapters containing a total of 194 articles.
The Environmental Law is described in its first articles as a regulatory
law interpreting the diverse constitutional provisions relating to the pres-
ervation and restoration of the ecological equilibrium, including the pro-
tection of the environment. Its basic objectives are to: (1) define general
ecological principles and establish the instruments for their application;
(2) achieve an ecological order; (3) preserve, restore, and improve the
environment; (4) protect the wilderness and aquatic flora and fauna;
(5) promote rational enjoyment and use of natural resources; (6) promote
the preservation of quality air and control pollution of the air, water
and soil; (7) promote cooperation between the federal government, federal
entities, and municipalities in this area; (8) promote the coordination of
the various subagencies and entities of the Federal Public Administration;
and (9) encourage the society as a whole to share responsibility for the
protection of the environment.
Article 3 of the Environmental Law defines thirty terms, including:
environment," "protected natural areas," "rational use of resources,"
"ecological criteria," "ecological imbalance," "ecological emergencies,"
and "ecological regions." The article also underscores the necessity of
decentralizing the duties required for its application and coordinating the
actions of federal, state, and municipal levels of government.
Title 4 of the Environmental Law, titled "Environmental Protection,"
is divided into seven chapters. The first three chapters refer to the
prevention and control of atmospheric contamination (Articles 110-116),
the prevention and control of water pollution of aquatic ecosystems
(Articles 117-133), and soil contamination (Articles 112-115). The law
also addresses nuclear contamination, noise pollution, thermal and light
energy pollution, and other forms of contamination, such as visual con-
tamination.
94. D.O., The General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection 149 (Jan.
28, 1988) [hereinafter Environmental Law].
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With respect to environmental protection, the Environmental Law as-
signs responsibility not only to SEDUE, but also to other agencies,
including the Secretaries of Health, Agriculture, Water Resources, Com-
merce and Industrial Growth, Energy, Mines and Para-state Industry,
Interior, Fishing, Transportation and Communication, Employment and
Social Work, and the National Commission of Nuclear Safety. It also
encourages societal participation in diverse tasks associated with envi-
ronmental protection.95 Although the Environmental Law became effective
March 1, 1988, the new environmental legislation will require legislation
to define its parameters.9 Until the new regulations are adopted, the
original regulations established in the early 1970's remain the law. One
encouraging event from an environmental standpoint is the passage of
new regulations regarding disposal of hazardous wastes. It is not yet
clear, however, whether local laws will be passed to make the suggestions
for decentralization suggested by Article 6 become a reality.
B. Environmental Requirements for Maquiladoras
As stated above, companies operating in Mexico under maquiladora
status normally import all of their raw materials and supplies into Mexico
on a temporary, duty-free basis. Therefore, they are required to export
from Mexico both the hazardous waste they generate from imported
hazardous or non-hazardous raw materials and all other hazardous wastes
derived from such imported materialsY7 Non-hazardous waste derived
from imported materials may be disposed of in Mexico only if approval
is obtained from the Mexican Customs Department. 9 Disposal of haz-
ardous waste derived from imported materials in Mexico is absolutely
barred.9 Mexican customs and maquiladora regulations,' °° however, do
acknowledge that a certain amount of wastes are consumed during the
manufacturing process, and they allow a shrinkage factor to be applied
to the total amount of waste that must be exported.
In addition to these requirements, all maquiladoras must comply with
the following environmental licensing, registration, and reporting require-
ments:
1. Environmental Operating License. All manufacturing plants must
obtain a license from the Secretary of Urban Development and Ecology
covering all aspects of their manufacturing activities. 01
95. See Environmental Law, supra note 94, arts. 157-59 ("Social Participation"); id. arts. 189-
94 ("Popular Outcry").
96. Telephone conversation with Diputada Maria Esparanza Moreljos Borja (Dec. 7, 1987). Ms.
Moreljos Borja expressed serious doubts with respect to the ability of authorities to apply the new
law.
97. D.O., The Regulations of the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental
Protection in Connection with Hazardous Waste art. 55 (Nov. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Hazardous
Waste Regulations].
98. Id.
99. Hazardous Waste Regulations, supra note 97, art. 55.
100. Maquiladora Decree, supra note 69, art. 15.
101. Environmental Law, supra note 94, art. 28.
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2. Environmental Impact Statement. The application for an En-
vironmental Operating License must be accompanied by a statement
concerning the potential impact of the company's operations on the
environment. This statement may result in the requirement of a full
environmental impact study, if authorities believe it is warranted. 0 2
3. Residual Water Discharge Registration. Water discharges from
a production pla.: must be registered with SEDUE. °3 Residential
water discharges are exempt from this requirement.
4. Hazardous Waste Generator Registration. Plants that generate
any waste considered to be hazardous under the applicable technical
standards must register with and obtain a generator's permit from
SEDUE.' 04
5. Ecological Bill of Lading. The importation, exportation, trans-
portation, and handling of any hazardous raw materials, hazardous
products, or hazardous waste must be carried out in accordance with
"Ecological Bills of Lading" which must be obtained for every ship-
ment. 105
6. Storage of Hazardous Materials. Hazardous raw materials or
waste materials must be stored in facilities which comply with special
requirements set forth in the regulations. 10
7. Reporting and Record Keeping Requirements. Regular reporting
of changes that affect the environment must be reported. Changes in
the information provided to SEDUE in the applications for any of
the licenses or registrations listed above must also be reported to
SEDUE. A permanent physical inventory of all hazardous materials
in the possession of a company at any given time must be kept and
must be made available for inspection by SEDUE. Companies that
generate hazardous waste must file biannual reports with SEDUE. 0 7
VI. LABOR ISSUES FOR MAQUILADORAS
Labor relations in Mexico are governed by Article 123 of the Mexican
Constitution of 1917, as well as the Federal Labor Law ("FLL") and
its derivative statutes 108 The FLL contains detailed provisions concerning
the minimum working conditions and rights which must be afforded by
an employer to its work force. These provisions are not waivable by the
employee.
The FLL established individual and collective labor relationships. An
individual labor relationship is created automatically when a person is
hired to perform a task subject to the control of the employer, whether
on a temporary basis or for an indefinite time period. 1°9 A collective
102. Id.
103. Hazardous Waste Regulations, supra note 97, art. 8.
104. Id.
105. Id. art. 45.
106. Id. arts. 14-15.
107. Id. art. 8.
108. D.O., Federal Labor Law (Apr. 1, 1970) [hereinafter Federal Labor Law]; see also CON-
STITUCION POLYrICA DE LOS EsTADos UN Ios MEXICANOS art. 123.
109. Federal Labor Law, supra note 108, art. 20.
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relationship exists when the work force is organized into a labor union
and the employer executes a collective bargaining agreement with the
union. 110
The issue of labor relations in Mexico is incredibly complex and steeped
in Mexican history. The following is only a brief summary of a few of
the key issues concerning individual labor entitlements and labor unions.
A. The Strength and Influence of Labor Unions in Mexico
The strength and influence of labor unions in Mexico varies widely
from state to state and city to city. In certain states, such as Tamaulipas,
and certain cities, such as Mexico City and surrounding areas, an agree-
ment with a union is virtually inevitable. In states such as Chihuahua,
however, only a small percentage of companies have collective bargaining
agreements with unions. Collective bargaining agreements which do exist
were entered into without coercion.
Unions in Mexico are voluntary organizations, and the FLL divides
them into several categories:
1. Trade Unions. These unions organize workers of a specific trade,
occupation or craft.
2. Enterprise Unions. These unions organize workers of a specific
company or firm.
3. Industry Unions. These unions organize workers of a specific type
of industry.
4. National Industry Unions. These unions organize workers of a
specific type of industry existing in two or more states."'
Unions freely form federations or confederations at the local and federal
levels. Federations of unions (called "centrals") may be classified as
traditional, moderate, or radical. Traditional federations are affiliated
with the ruling political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party
("PRI"). The famous Mexican Congress of Workers ("CTM") is the
best example of a moderate federation. It forms part of the Labor
Congress. The more radical or independent unions, which are usually
affiliated with more radical political parties, are concentrated in certain
southern states of Mexico. It is estimated that of the approximately 14.2
million people that comprise the work force, 6.3 million are organized
in unions, and 5.9 million of these union members are part of federations
within the more moderate Labor Congress." 2
Unions are permanent associations of at least twenty workers who seek
to defend their mutual rights and interests. Unions must be certified by
the corresponding Labor Conciliation and Arbitration Board ("Labor
Board")."3 The FLL recognizes not only organized unions, but also
110. Id. art. 356.
111. Id. art. 360.
112. See DE REGIL, UNIONS IN MExxcAN LABOR POLICY AND PRACTICE, BUREAu OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRs (1985).
113. Federal Labor Law, supra note 108, arts. 355-56.
Spring 1991]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
coalitions of workers, which are temporary associations of any number
of workers that have banded together for the defense of mutual rights
and interests. Although only unions may execute collective bargaining
agreements,114 a coalition does have the right to strike under certain
circumstances." 5 Not every worker may be a union member. Workers
who are considered to be white collar employers ("empleados de con-
fianza") may not be members of the union. 1 6
The FLL establishes minimum benefits and minimum working con-
ditions to be met for all workers, regardless of whether they are organized.
Therefore, in many areas of Mexico, there is little incentive for the
employees to unionize if the employers follow the FLL.
B. The Labor Relationship
Under the FLL, when a person is hired to carry out a task under the
control of the employer, a labor relationship arises, unless the relationship
is only for one specific task or for a specified time period. Once a labor
relationship is created, the employee can only be terminated for cause. 
l 7
If no justifiable cause can be found for the termination, the employer
pays a severance payment in lieu of litigation in the administrative labor
courts.
If a company's workers form a union, they may request that the
company enter into a collective bargaining agreement setting forth the
terms and conditions of employment for the company's employees. The
white collar employees may receive the benefits of this agreement even
though they cannot belong to the workers union."l 8 If there is no union,
terms and conditions of employment are embodied in individual em-
ployment contracts. If no written employment contract exists, the pro-
tections of the FLL presumptively apply and form an implied contract
between the employer and the employee." 9
While varying circumstances dictate different quantums of severance
payments for an employee's termination, a typical amount is the sum
of three months wages plus twelve days wages for each year the employee
has worked. 20 In addition, if a terminated employee brings an action
against his employer and the Labor Board determines that the employee
was terminated without just cause, the employer may be held liable for
the payment of an additional twenty days wages for each year worked.'
2
'
On the other hand, if a properly documented cause for termination exists,
the employer may terminate the employee without liability, unless the
114. Id. art. 388.
115. Id. art. 440; CoNsTrrucION PoLMcA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOs MExicANos art. 123, § XVIII.
116. Federal Labor Law, supra note 108, art. 363.
117. Id. art. 47.
118. Id. art. 184.
119. Id. art. 21.
120. Id. art. 50.
121. Id.
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employee has worked for more than fifteen years, in which case wages
of twelve days per year worked must be paid. 22
While wages paid in the maquila program are higher than in most
other employment sectors and peso amounts paid are much higher than
in previous years because of inflation, the standard of living of Mexican
workers has declined dramatically, and they continue to lose purchasing
power. 123 Indeed, the monthly cost of a subsistence food basket for a
typical Mexican blue collar worker is more than he can afford. A maquila
worker in Juarez, at the highest salary available, earns 27.5% less than
his minimum subsistence requirements.' 24
To encourage workers to stay, the average maquila operator pays its
employees a package of forty-three percent of the salary amount in the
form supermarket coupons, savings funds, punctuality bonuses, produc-
tion bonuses, and seniority bonuses, in addition to wages. 125 Nevertheless,
worker turnover and the inability of workers to meet the minimum
subsistence needs remains a serious problem. Although there is a shortage
of trained persons in the maquila industry, the average maquila worker
in Juarez earns only 540o of what is needed to meet subsistence needs.
This includes incentives, bonuses, and other supplemental pay packages.
VII. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Although foreign investment in Mexico has increased greatly over the
past ten years, direct foreign investment is only a minor part of the
overall gross investment picture. Foreign direct investment is less than
ten percent of the total gross fixed investment and less than five percent
of the gross domestic product. Sixty-three percent of the cumulative
foreign investment was from the United States. 26
The United States is Mexico's number one trading partner, and ne-
gotiations are underway for the development of an extensive bilateral
trade agreement between the two countries. Mexico has substantially
reduced its ownership of para-state companies and has liberalized its
trade policies to allow foreign competition, thereby strengthening its own
industries. It has liberalized the rules for direct foreign investment and
has made tremendous strides in controlling inflation and restructuring
international debt.
Mexico is a nation of tremendous natural resources. It contains a
surface area of 764,000 square miles and is the thirteenth largest country
in the world. It ranks eleventh in world population with an estimated
population of 84 million, and it has a labor force of over 27 million. 27
The Mexican literacy rate is high, and per capita income is $2,080.00 a
122. Id. art. 162.
123. Sander & Mendoza, Compensation Overview, TwiN PLANTS Naws 34-37 (May 1990).
124. Id. at 34.
125. Id. at 35.
126. REvTEw OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra note 1, at 5-2.
127. Id. at xi.
Spring 1991]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
year. Mexico is the world's leading producer of silver and it produces
many other raw minerals. Mexico has the world's fourth largest oil
reserves, and it is proximate to the massive United States market.
128
On the down side, one-half of Mexico's population is under the age
of fifteen, and the minimum wages, plus bonuses in the booming industries
such as the maquila industry, are insufficient to meet subsistence needs.
Furthermore, Mexico faces stiff labor competition from other nations
facing worse financial circumstances. Mexico also has a backlog of severe
environmental problems that it must address. Even so, it is apparent
that Mexico is committed to encouraging direct foreign investment and
participating as a positive player in the world economic community.
Success will depend on Mexico's ability to promote foreign investment,
strengthen its industries, and utilize its comparative advantages in the
labor market to acquire technology and develop a sound financial base.
With the foreign investment law changes promoted by President Salinas
de Gotari, Mexico is making a good start in this direction.
128. Manufacturing and commerce, including domestic wholesale and retail services and inter-
national trading services, make up the largest sectors of Mexico's economy. Within these sectors,
petroleum and refined petroleum products represent Mexico's largest single industry and produce
the greatest percentage of Mexico's foreign exchange. Mexico currently produces approximately 2.5
million barrels per day of crude petroleum and exports approximately one-half of its production.
The second largest producer of foreign exchange are the maquiladoras.
Mexico's gross domestic product was $176.7 billion in 1988, or approximately $2,116 per capita,
compared with $19,646 per capita in the United States. This represents a modest growth of 1.1%
over 1987. The gross domestic product for 1989 was projected to be 1.5 %'. Id.
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